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SUPREME 

COURT WATCH 

By Reginald C. Oh 
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court settled a circuit court conflict over the viability of"reverse age discriminations" 
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA). The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that statutorily 
protected workers over the age of forty may not bring an 
ADEA claim alleging that their employer discriminated 
against them in favor ofolder employees. 
In Cline, employees between the ages offorty and forty­
nine sued their employer, General Dynamics, alleging that a 
1997 collective bargaining agreement violated the ADEA. 
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discrimi­
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l). However, only 
workers who are at least forty years old are permitted to bring 
a cause ofaction under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). 
Under the collective bargaining agreement, General Dy­
namics eliminated its previous obligation to provide full 
health care benefits to employees upon retirement. General 
Dynamics, however, agreed to continue to provide full health 
care benefits upon retirement to current employees who were 
at least fifty years of age on July 1, 1997. The plaintiffs in 
Cline were alleging that General Dynamics committed age 
discrimination by providing health insurance to employees 
over fifty years ofage while denying health insurance to em­
ployees between the ages offorty and forty-nine. 
The question presented in Cline is whether the claim ofage 
discrimination by members of the protected class because of 
their relative youth is cognizable under the ADEA. Ifthe Cline 
plaintiffs had brought a traditional ADEA claim, they would 
have alleged that their employer somehow discriminated 
against them, employees over forty, in favor of employees 
younger than forty. In Cline, however, these same workers be­
tween the ages offorty to forty-nine were alleging age discrirn-
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ination in being denied health care benefits upon retirement, 
not because of their relative oldage, but because of their rela­
tive youth in comparison to workers over the age of fifty. In 
both a traditional age discrimination situation and in a reverse 
age discrimination situation, the same protected class, workers 
between the ages offorty and forty-nine, is alleging that age 
was used as the basis for an adverse employment decision. 
To decide the "reverse age discrimination" issue requires 
an inquiry into the central purpose of the ADEA. Was the 
ADEA meant to prohibit discrimination against the old in 
favor ofthe young, orwas the ADEA meant to protect against 
any discrimination on the basis ofage, as long as the class or 
person alleging discrimination is at least forty years old? 
In Cline, the federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, 
ruling that the ADEA does not recognize a claim for "reverse 
age discrimination," a claim in which younger employees al­
lege that they were discriminated against in favor ofolder 
employees. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
district court ruling, holding that the plain meaning of the 
ADEA prohibits age discrimination regardless ofwhether it 
is discrimination against the younger in favor of the older, or 
discrimination against the older in favor of the younger. The 
Sixth Circuit's decision was contrary to the decisions in other 
circuits, which held that reverse age discrimination was not 
cognizable under the ADEA. 
The Court granted certiorari and reversed the Sixth Cir­
cuit decision. The Court, in a majority decision written by 
Justice Souter, held that the "reverse age discrimination 
claims" are not cognizable based upon the language of the 
ADEA, because the "text, structure, purpose, and history of 
the ADEA" shows that the statute "does not mean to stop an 
employer from favoring an older worker over a younger one." 
124 S. Ct. at 1248-49. The Court reasoned that when the 
ADEA prohibits discrimination because of an individual's 
"age," the use ofthe term "age" in the ADEA means the com­
monly understood, narrow sense of"old age," rather than the 
broader definition ofage as marking the length of a person's 
life. In other words, the Court held that under the ADEA, 
the statute effectively prohibits an employer from discrimi­
nating against an employee on account ofhis or her oldage, 
rather than prohibiting employers from discriminating on the 
basis ofage generally. 
The Court justified its narrow statutory construction of 
the term "age" on several grounds. First, the Court conclud­
ed that upon review ofthe legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of the ADEA, the core concern ofCongress in 
enacting the statute was to protect "a relatively old worker 
from discrimination that works to the advantage of the rela­
tively young." 124 S. Ct. at 1243. 
Second, the Court supported its statutory analysis by em­
phasizing that the statute restricts the protected class that 
may bring suit under the ADEA to those forty years old and 
older. The Court reasoned, "IfCongress had been worrying 
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about protecting the younger against the older, it would not 
likely have ignored everyone under 40." Id 
Third, the Court rejected the argument made by dissent­
ing Justice Clarence Thomas that the term "age" must be 
treated in the same way that the terms "race" and "sex" are 
treated forTitle VII purposes. Title VII prohibits discrimina­
tion in employment on the basis of race and sex. While the 
original purpose ofTitle VII was to protect racial minorities 
and women, Title VII's language has been expanded to in­
clude all racial discrimination claims, whether made by 
whites or racial minorities, and it has been expanded to in­
clude all sex discrimination claims, whether made by men or 
women. Similarly, Justice Thomas contended that the term 
"age" should be understood to prohibit all age discrimination, 
whether the discrimination is against the relatively young or 
the relatively old. 
In rejecting the dissent's analysis, the Court used a lin­
guistic move to conclude that the term age should not be 
treated in the same way that the terms race and sex are em­
ployed for Title VII purposes. The Court reasoned: 
"Race" and "sex" are general terms that in every day usage 
require modifiers to indicate any relatively narrow applica­
tion. We do not commonly understand "race" to refer only 
to the black race, or "sex" to refer only to the female. But the 
prohibition of age discrimination is readily read more nar­
rowly than analogous provisions dealing with race and sex. 
Id at 1247. In other words, the Court reasoned that statutory 
interpretation should be influenced by the common usage of 
terms in everyday usage. 
Whether the result in Cline makes sense from a policy 
standpoint, the Cline Court's reasoning is flawed. A strong ar­
gument can be made that the central purpose of the ADEA 
was not only to protect relatively older workers from discrim­
ination in favor ofrelatively younger workers. Rather, an argu­
ment can be made that the central purpose ofthe ADEA was 
to protect the class of older workers, regardless ofwhether 
these workers above the age offorty are being adversely treat­
ed based on their relatively youth or based on their relative 
agedness. In other words, even accepting the Court's interpre­
tation of"age" for ADEA purposes to mean "old age," that 
interpretation still supports permitting the workers in Cline to 
make a cognizable reverse age discrimination claim. 
To understand the last point more clearly, a hypothetical is 
in order. Imagine that an employer decided to provide full 
health care benefits upon retirement only to workers over the 
age ofeighty. An employee aged seventy-nine wants to sue 
under the ADEA and allege age discrimination. This admit­
tedly unlikely scenario presents the same issue of"reverse age 
discrimination'' raised in Cline. Under the Cline Court's rea­
soning, however, the seventy-nine year old would not have a 
cognizable ADEA claim, because he or she is claiming dis­
crimination on the basis of his or her relative youth in com­
parison to relatively older eighty year old employees. 
A strong _argument can be made that the hypothetical re­
verse discrimination claim alleged by a seventy-nine year old 
worker presents a fairly compelling case ofage discrimination 
that ought to be prohibited by the ADEA. It should be ir­
relevant that the seventy-nine year old is being disfavored in 
comparison to workers even older than him or her, because 
the bottom line is, a statutorily defined elderly worker is 
being treated adversely on account ofhis age. In other words, 
it could be argued that the class of forty to forty-nine year 
olds in Cline is in actuality still alleging discrimination based 
on "old age" as defined by the ADEA. 
Ultimately, even if the Court's statutory reasoning lay on 
untenable grounds, its restriction of the scope of the ADEA 
implicitly acknowledges that the ADEA has strayed very far 
offcourse from its original purposes. As Professor Samuel Is­
sacharoff argues, contrary to original beliefs, the phenomenon 
ofaging in the workplace does not fit in neatly with the anti­
discrimination paradigm associated with constitutional and 
statutory prohibitions against invidious racism and sexism. See 
Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimina­
tion Really Age Discrimination? TheADEA's Unnatural Solu­
tion, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 780 (1997). Discrimination against 
elderly workers reflects costs rather than animus or prejudice 
for the simple reason that older workers tend to be more ex­
pensive workers. Thus, Professor Issacharoff challenges the 
use ofan anti-discrimination framework to deal with age-re­
lated issues involving economics and not animus or prejudice. 
"If the source of risk to older workers is economics ... a real 
question emerges as to why this problem should be folded into 
the antidiscrimination rubric." Id. at 800. Accordingly, in 
Cline, the denial ofhealth benefits to workers under fifty years 
old probably does not reflect hostility to "younger-older" 
workers but instead, it likely reflects the employer's attempt 
to draw an admittedly arbitrary line to save costs. 
The Court's decision to reject "reverse age discrimination'' 
claims under the ADEA, then, does not reflect a straight­
forward application of techniques of statutory construction 
and interpretation. Instead, it may reflect the Court's notion 
that the discrimination that occurred in Cline reflects the re­
alities and legitimacy ofeconomic-based age discrimination 
engaged by employers, age-based employment practices that 
are increasingly denying benefits to "younger-older" workers. 
Such practices include Early Retirement Incentive Plans 
provided for employees only over a certain age. The complex­
ities raised by the problem of reverse age discrimination 
should spark Congress to consider amending the ADEA to 
reflect the economic realities behind age-based decision­
making in the employment context. 
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